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Decentralization and Education in Uganda

Immaculate K. Namukasa, the University of Western Ontario
Ronald Buye, Makerere University.

Abstract
Uganda is one of the African countries that have decentralized its education
system. This country-specific paper examines the implementation process and the
way forward to decentralizing education in a developing country. There have
been gains and challenges from decentralization and processes linked to it. While
the
implementation
of
Universal
Primary
Education
in
1997
increased significantly school enrollment as well as the number of
classrooms; on the other hand, student-teacher and student-resources ratio
also increased, and corruption and mismanagement of resources remained a
challenge.

Résumé
Uganda est un des pays d'Afrique qui ont décentralisé leur système
d'enseignement. Cet article spécifique sur un seul pays examine les processus
d'exécution et la façon d'avancer la décentralisation dans un pays au cours de
développement. Il y a des gains et aussi des problèmes provenant de la
décentralisation et des processus qui l'accompagnent. L'application de la loi
"Éducation primaire universelle" en 1997 a augmenté considérablement l' effectif
des écoles et le nombre des classes mais le rapport élèves/instructeurs ainsi que
celui entre élèves et ressources ont aussi augmenté, et la corruption et la
mauvaise administration des ressources constituent encore des obstacles.

Introduction
Developing and developed countries are decentralizing their education systems.
In some countries, especially developing countries, educational decentralization is
part of a larger exercise of devolving all public services. In sub-Saharan Africa the
factors that encourage centralization include positive effects such as political
stability and economic development, as well as push factors like existing regional
inequalities and inadequacies, real and perceived, of central governments.
Multilateral and bilateral donor communities are encouraging countries in the
South to decentralize and/or privatize public services. Among these countries
Uganda has proceeded quickly in an almost all-at-once decentralization strategy
(Naidoo, 2002; Steiner, 2006).
In Uganda, decentralization is not totally new. Regional governments
mainly in the form of monarchies and chiefdoms were abolished in 1966, four
years after independence (Mushemeza, 2003). The post independence constitution
of Uganda, laid a legal framework for re-decentralization based on regional
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governments but this never took off. The current Ugandan government
administered some decentralization in the areas under its control in the early
1980s while it was still a guerilla force called the National Resistance Army (now
a political force called National Resistance Movement). After it came to power in
1986, the government adopted country-wide decentralization, cost sharing and
privatization as policies supported by multinational donor agencies such as the
World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). To date
most government-administered services (except a few, such as the police and the
army) that have not yet been privatized are decentralized. These include primary
healthcare, education, basic services in water and sanitation, feeder roads and
agricultural extension. Decentralization has changed the delivery of public
services, particularly education.
Education has been decentralized to local governments beginning with
primary (an equivalence of elementary) education. Many programs have been put
in place to facilitate decentralization of education service delivery. It appears that
the decentralization of education has been more effectual at the elementary level
than at other levels.
In the context of Uganda, decentralization is taken to mean the
reassignment of some decision-making (management) authority, responsibility
and tasks from the central government to local governments. Legal, financial,
administrative and political management of public functions has become the
responsibility of the local community, under the leadership of Local Councils
(LCs). Decentralization appears to be based on the governance idea of
subsidiarity: matters should be handled by the smallest (or lowest) authority.
Subsidiarity means that a central authority should have a subsidiary function,
performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more
immediate or local level. Central authorities delegate management to sub-national,
municipal or local units (Naidoo, 2002). There are varying degrees to which this
delegation happens, ranging from deconcentration at the lower end, through
delegation, to devolution at the upper extreme. To some scholars and some
multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, privatization is a form of
devolution (Hanson, 1998; Suzuki, 2002; UNESCO, 2004).
Deconcentration involves the spatial relocation of decision–making;
some administrative responsibility is transferred to lower level governments.
Because it is the lowest form of decentralization, deconcentration, also referred to
as administrative decentralization, involves the transfer of tasks and responsibility
but not of authority (Hanson, 1998; Naidoo, 2002; UNESCO, 2004).
Under moderate decentralization—delegation—the transferred decisionmaking authority may be withdrawn from the local government at the discretion
of the central unit. Delegation involves the transfer of fiscal and administrative
tasks but not of political tasks.
When the highest degree of authority, which includes political and
market responsibility for governing, is transferred to the local government
devolution is said to be taking place. Devolution involves the creation or
strengthening, financially or legally, of sub-national units of governments. Naidoo
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(2002) compares the status of education decentralization in six sub-Saharan
African countries including Tanzania and Ghana. He identifies Uganda as the only
example of devolution. Devolution of education is political and financial
(UNESCO, 2004). It goes hand in hand with the introduction of market forces to
the system through privatization. In Uganda elementary education was
universalized in 1997. Plans are underway to universalize secondary education in
2007. With the case of devolution, it is crucial to asses the risks of shedding
financial responsibility to local governments and to communities.
Historical Considerations
The Ugandan education system was one of the best in Sub-Saharan Africa (Odaet,
1990; Ssekamwa, 1997). During the economic and political instabilities it was
resilient to the inadequacies of central government (Heynman, 1983; Paige, 2000)
and to political and economic difficulties that ensued. As in other former colonies,
Christian missionaries introduced formal schooling in Uganda decades before
British control over Uganda was signed in 1890. Missionaries and other foreign
groups such as East Indians were in charge of founding, administering and
funding schools (Odaet, 1990). Local Ugandans, mainly traditional chiefs had a
role, in the spirit of self-help, to provide building materials, land and labor
(Ssekamwa, 1997). The willingness of communities to contribute in cash and kind
is a traditional strength of education in Africa. The missionary-founded schools
were built on various Western models of education. A majority of these schools
had coherent structures and strong religious traditions. The missionaries supplied
human resources, adopted curriculum and provided textbooks and equipment. It is
after one of the traditional kingdoms, the Kingdom of Buganda became a British
Protectorate that all schools became the domain of the British Empire, with
English as the official language of instruction (Odaet, 1990). But the colonial
government did not yet involve itself in establishing, financing and administering
schools.
Around 1920, the Uganda protectorate government gradually began to
assist the missionaries in the provision of education. The central government
began constructing public schools and aiding schools with grants. In 1963 the
Education Act was passed to place all grant-aided schools under the control of the
government. This progressively curtailed the control of schools by racial and
religious bodies, but major differences remained among schools founded by
different bodies.
In 1970 a second Education Act was introduced to encourage the
establishment of private schools in Uganda. This act streamlined the requirements
and procedures for establishing and operating a private school (Ssekamwa, 1997).
A few more church-founded schools and a couple of international schools were
established. Private colleges were also established. Most education policy and
planning commissions and reviews, prior to and after independence in 1962,
recommended more support by central government for academic secondary
schools and tertiary institutions. Smyth (1970) explains that secondary education
was seen to enhance economic development and was seen as a way of increasing
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the number of Africans in responsible positions—Africanization—that was
urgently needed with independence inevitably coming. The most support for
expansion that primary schools got was indirectly through increased output of new
teachers from existing training colleges. Many primary schools lacked some of the
basic facilities particularly textbooks and equipment.
Since the end of the war a couple of national education plans have shaped
the education system of Uganda: the 1987 Education Policy Review Commission
(EPRC) which reported on the state of the system of education after the political,
military and economic turmoil of 1970-1980’s. The EPRC made
recommendations including change in focus to accommodate the long held desire
of basic primary education. It underscored the role of science and mathematics for
national development and social transformation. The Education Bill (2000)
revised and updated the 1970 Education Acts and provided for a more
contemporary framework. With the post war government many changes in the
Legal framework took place including The National Constitution for the Republic
of Uganda that underscored education as a right of every Ugandan, and the
Republic of Uganda Local Government Act (1997) that transferred Primary and
Secondary Education services to Local Governments at the district level-- an
example of decentralization of education delivery. Many programs have been put
in place to facilitate decentralization of education service delivery, including: the
Education Strategic Investment Plan (ESIP); Universal Primary Education
(UPE); School Facilities Grant (SFG); Teacher Development and Management
System (TDMS). In 1997 elementary education was universalized beginning with
grades 1 to 4.
The growth of private schools had been slow until the late 1990s. Several
factors caused private education to grow exponentially in the late 1990s. These
include economic and political stability; further, recovery from war increased
school enrollments and Universal Primary Education (UPE). Many schools are
now owned by individuals or groups of persons. In 2005, there were 11,850
Government aided and 1,521 Private primary schools. There were 1651
Government aided secondary schools and about 1898 private secondary ones
(Bitamazire, 2005). Clearly at the post-primary level the private sector is over
taking the public sector in education provision. This is without implications for
the curriculum delivered. Private schools for children from middle-class and
affluent families are better-equipped and staffed with more affluent teachers.
There are also many impoverished private schools for students of low socioeconomic status and/or with low academic achievement. These schools are
poorly-equipped and staffed with ill-paid teachers in order to keep the tuition
affordable for parents. Before Universal Secondary Education (USE) is
implemented there will be a steady growth of private secondary schools that
survive on meager resources. Very few public schools have been built even at the
secondary level where there is increasing need. With the commercialization of
higher education, private universities and colleges have emerged to supplement
what used to be exclusively publicly-funded tertiary education. Efforts towards
expansion and improvement of technical institutes are also limited.
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Decentralization of the Ugandan education system is closely linked to other
education reforms including the universalization of basic education, growing
privatization and commercialization of higher education (Naidoo, 2002;
UNESCO, 2004)
Education decentralization in Uganda was not an educational reform, as
it was in other countries such as Sri Lanka and Australia. The Ugandan process of
decentralization, devolution of primary education, was mainly driven by national
political will rather than by educational reform (Stasavage, 2005). This meant that
legal frameworks of decentralization in general were helpfully modified and made
compatible with those of decentralization in education.
Decentralizing Administration
In 1986, the National Resistance Movement government put in place a new
system of local governance at first called Resistance Councils, another sign of a
political form of decentralization. Resistance councils were later renamed Local
Councils (LCs). The LC system is a five-level tiered system. It progresses from
the zone (village) level (I), through parish (II), sub-county/division (III),
county/sub-district (IV) and district/municipal (V) to the central government level.
The first phase of the LC I to LC V tiered local governance was launched in 13
(out of the then 45) districts. Councils at lower levels have nine five-yearly elected
councilors including a chairman, vice chairman and secretaries representing
women, youth and security. Starting from LC III going up to LC V, the councils
are administrative bodies in addition to being political and legal bodies. LC III is
headed by the sub-county chief in rural areas and by town clerks in towns. The
district administration, LC V in the capital city is headed by the mayor; elsewhere
it is headed by an administrative officer. Councilors, especially at the lower levels,
are unpaid volunteers.1 Starting at LC II going up to the district, the service
commission recruits and remunerates administrative personnel like sub-county
chiefs and parish council agents. In 1993 the Local Government (Resistance
Councils) Statute was passed to provide for the transfer of powers and resources
to Local Councils.
Currently the broader decentralization process in Uganda is guided by the
1997 Local Government Act. With this Act, Resistance Councils were renamed
Local Councils (LCs). Education was listed as one of the major public functions
for which the highest level in the local hierarchy, the District council, was to be
directly responsible (Local Government Act, 1997, Article 176(2) of the
Constitution, Section 97 & 98). In the Act the levels of education that were to be
decentralized were listed as nursery, elementary, secondary, trade education,
special education and technical education. Higher and university education
continued to lie outside the governance of local councils. The objectives of the
Act were to:
• give full effect to the decentralization of functions, powers,
responsibilities and services at all levels of local governments;
• ensure democratic participation in and control of decision making by
the people concerned;
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•
•
•

establish a democratic, political and gender-sensitive administrative
set-up in local governments;
establish sources of revenue and financial accountability; and
provide for the election of Local Councils.

A Centralized Education System
Before decentralization, all systems were centralized under the national
government and the district/municipality governments. The districts implemented
policies chosen by the central government. They carried out activities on behalf of
the ministry of education. Key personnel included the Permanent Secretary and
the national Chief Education Officer (CEO) at the national Ministry of Education
level, and the District Education officer (DEO) at the district level. Ssekamwa
and Lugumba (1973) observe that during that time the key person who
administered elementary schools’ educational service in any district was the
District Education Officer (DEO). With the assistance of one or two assistant
inspectors of schools attached to his office, the DEO advised elementary school
head teachers. The DEO was, on behalf of the national Chief Education Officer
(CEO), responsible for the inspection of elementary schools, in-service teacher
education, professional development workshops and courses, transfer of teachers,
and the administration of grants for school buildings, equipment, furniture and
funds for elementary school teachers’ salaries. The DEO was answerable to the
Permanent Secretary.
The two-tiered centralized governance of education posed a problem for
districts far away from the main national administrative city, Kampala. Worse
still, many local areas were far from their district headquarters. Personnel at the
district level were limited. The unequal access and other inequities were
aggravated by political instability and the economic difficulties of the 1970s and
1980s. At many times local plans could not be fully implemented because no
particular unit—district or national—was responsible. There was also a
widespread lack of key competent and skilled personnel. Other factors such as
lack of training and capacity-building, along with growing divisions along tribal
and regional lines also contributed to the inadequacy of centralization. The new
government proposed decentralizing governance of public services as a panacea
for all these challenges.
Objectives of Decentralizing Uganda’s Education
The government of Uganda perceived many benefits of decentralizing educational
governance. It conceived that decentralization would: (a) eliminate what it saw as
unnecessary bureaucratic channels, (b) reduce corruption by minimizing the
number of office levels to be consulted, (c) boost the level of monitoring since
there would be physical proximity of local governments, (d) result in the
management of the education system according to local priorities (e) improve
financial accountability since local people and personnel would be motivated to
monitor local governance, and (f) raise local revenue to fund services.
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In 1998 the government embarked on strengthening the decentralization
system in order to improve the management and delivery of elementary education
services. This also illustrated a shift in roles, from deconcentration to devolution.
The districts ceased to be mere implementers of central government policies. The
district staff base was expanded beyond supervisory roles to engage in spending,
accounting, planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation. They now receive
capitation grants from the central Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
(MoFED). These funds are spent and accounted for according to guidelines
provided by the national Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES). District
councils also prepare district capacity-building plans and budgets. Each district, as
a member of the national education planning process, prepares sector plans for
district capacity-building. They draw plans such as for classroom construction and
resource acquisitions that have to be approved by MoES. These district plans and
budgets increasingly contribute to the central MoES planning and budgeting.
Since educational decentralization was part of a wider political reform, it
is unlikely that careful thought was given at the planning stage to far-reaching
educational implications of decentralization and to how it would be interpreted in
practice. It appears decentralization laws preceded workable models of
decentralization. Although phasing in decentralization allows for experimentation
and the possibility of revisions, Uganda chose the all-at-once strategy. All districts
took responsibility of their education systems, whether they were ready or not.
Post-Decentralization Ugandan Education System
Although decentralization was phased in quickly at the regional level, at the
school level decentralization appears to have proceeded more slowly. For
elementary schools the District government is the highest point of reference and
authority. Local authorities have financial control and general decision-making
powers over elementary schools. The schools are accountable, through the
subsequent levels of governance, to the Education Committee headed by the
District Education Officer (DEO). This system of power-sharing has made
decision-making quick and easy. But one wonders about the challenges that come
with easy and quick decision-making in a developing system. At times decisions
about education issues are made by personnel who have little experience in
education governance. The success of decentralization depends on the question:
How have education policy makers addressed the challenges that come with local
governance in a country where resources are neither adequately nor evenly
distributed? One way has been to strengthen both the central and local
administrative infrastructure in support of educational decentralization.
The New National Governance Structure
In 1998 the Ministry of Education underwent post-constitutional restructuring.
The central government began strengthening infrastructures and institutions at
MoES. Many new national institutions were created and many roles were
decentralized to districts. Central government now concentrates more on planning,
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policy analysis, curriculum and examination reform, national assessment, and
monitoring and evaluation. Before decentralization three semi-autonomous
institutions existed: National Curriculum Development Center (NCDC); Uganda
National Examinations Board (UNEB); and National Council for Higher
Education (NCHE). Under the new structure, as shown at the bottom of Figure 1
(page 101), the MoES is comprised of eight departments for planning and policy
analysis; a commissioner heads each department. A policy analysis unit, a
resource centre, and three technical units (procurement, construction management
and instructional materials) were established. In addition to institutions that
existed before, there are six semi-autonomous institutions (see left of Figure 1,
page 101) that have been established to handle more specialized functions of the
Ministry. These include Education Standards Agency (ESA), Education Service
Commission (ESC), Uganda National Council for UNESCO. Many activities are
coordinated by multiple units, institutions and departments.
No institution was eliminated: NCDC and UNEB still exist, and NCHE
was transformed into a department and two institutions. Many activities are
coordinated by multiple units, institutions and departments. For example, to
review the curricula, the government set up a task force that involved different
actors mainly at the Ministry. MoES outlined its aspirations for the new
curriculum before forwarding the responsibility to the NCDC (MoES, September
2003). Evidently, support structures with defined roles are in place to support the
implementation of decentralization of education. For instance, ESIP is responsible
for building the capacity of district and local governments effectively and
efficiently to deliver public educational services and to assure the quality of
privately delivered services. The TDMS program is intended to improve quality
and equity in the provision of elementary education through improved teacher
training, development and professional support.
In the process of building local devolved systems centralized
bureaucracies were strengthened. Strong central regulation in such areas as
curriculum design, assessment, teacher development and higher education
remained. This is not surprising for a country where political and economic
motives were central to decentralization. Naidoo (2002) dubs this a case of intense
state control of some functions being coupled with greater decentralization of
other aspects. It is centralized decentralization. The co-existence of both
processes is very supportive but is not without contradictions. It is likely to
produce lived tensions for school principals, teachers, parents and the local
community.
New District Governance Structure
At the district level some institutions were created to support the office of the
DEO. With decentralization, key personnel in the district include: the Chief
Administrative Officer (CAO), who is the district accounting officer, and the
District Inspector of Schools (DIS), whose work is more pronounced at the
elementary level. The District Education officer (DEO) remains the head of the
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education department and Education Committee at the district to whom the head
teachers (school principals) are answerable.
Figure 1. Structure of Central Education
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All the district education staff and institutions, including the DEO,
operate under the control and supervision of the CAO. The CAO is an appointed
member to the tier V District Local Council (DLC). The DLC is the main
budgetary unit in the district. The DEO is now directly answerable to the CAO,
whereas in the past the DEO was answerable to the Permanent Secretary at the
Ministry of Education. The DEOs are responsible for monitoring and supporting
all schools within their districts, and they work with the CAO to develop plans
and budgets. Through the District Service Commission (DSC), each district
recruits and assigns elementary school teachers, as they do other public servants.
The CAO receives funds for education in the form of school staff salaries, funds
for school supplies and grants, which are dispatched to principals through the
DEO. From the time elementary education was universalized the central
government has been responsible for funding elementary education under the UPE
program.
Elementary schools report to the DEO and receive communication from
the District Headquarters, but secondary and tertiary schools still primarily report
to the Director of Education at the central government who then is answerable to
the Permanent Secretary. By law, finance and administration are decentralized for
elementary, secondary, and technical levels (Wamala, 2004). In practice, the shift
in roles for the MoES from delivery of education to policymaking, investment
management, and quality assurance is only at the elementary education level.
Policy, budgeting and planning for secondary schools are not yet decentralized.
This might be interpreted as a form of phased-in decentralization or as a selected
focus at one level at the expense of the other. In secondary schools it is mainly the
salaries of teachers and the capitation grant that are channeled through the
decentralization structure. Other issues regarding secondary education, such as the
recruitment and transfer of teachers, remain the responsibility of the ministry. As
regards inspection, there is ambiguity as to whether the District Inspectorate staff
has anything practical to do with secondary schools. There is also a question about
whether these staff are qualified enough to inspect secondary schools.
Decentralization has had almost no effect on pre-elementary/kindergarten
education and day care. This level of education remains in the private sector.
Financial Decentralization
In many Latin American and Caribbean countries educational administration has
been decentralized. Educational finance has also been decentralized, but to a
lesser extent. In Uganda financial decentralization is in the lead.
Through financial decentralization, education grants are calculated
centrally and then released to the districts as conditional, non-conditional or
equalization grants. Equalization grants are paid to local governments for giving
subsidies or making special provision to the least developed districts (Local
Government Act, 1997, section 84(4)). Conditional grants are budgeted for as
capitation grants that are distributed to the schools in accordance with their
enrolments. UNESCO (2004) suggests that school formula funding, based on
enrollment, location and the like, can reduce the opportunities for corruption.
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Capitation grants are spent on instructional and scholastic materials, on cocurricular activities, on school management and on administration. Whereas a
number of these are donor-specific initiatives, elementary teachers’ salaries,
classroom construction, school capitation grants, support for the Teacher
Development and Management System (TDMS), and funds for instructional
materials are provided through a special programme, the general Poverty Action
Fund (PAF). The PAF is the main source of financial support to elementary
education. Currently, about 75 percent of the total PAF transferred for education
and 72 percent of all government resources for education are provided through the
districts (USAID, 2000).
Among conditional grants are a variety of special expenditures aimed at
supporting the curriculum: the School Facilities Grant (SFG), teacher salaries for
elementary schools, UPE grants, and the Instructional Material Grant (IMG). The
ministry sends funds for secondary school teacher salaries to schools through
the district whereas salaries for elementary teachers are part of conditional grants
that the district receives from the central government. The SFG supports
communities’ efforts to improve the accessibility and quality of elementary school
education. The target is to achieve better classroom facility ratios, which include a
teacher-pupil ratio of 1:55, a desk-pupil ratio of 1:3, a latrine-pupil ratio of 1:40
and at least four teachers’ houses per school (MoES fact file, 2003). The UPE
capitation grant provides less than $10 per child per year for children who are in
their first three years of elementary education. UPE grants and the IMG are aimed
at providing adequate quantities of good quality instructional materials. The CAO
receives and ensures the prompt disbursement of education grants to schools. The
CAO accounts for these funds in a proper manner, and ensures that conditional
monies such as the UPE grants are not diverted to other needs. Diversion of funds,
especially at the school level, is a common challenge.
Provision of infrastructure involves many activities and actors. Major
activities include planning, budgeting, release of funds, accounting, reporting,
monitoring and evaluation. These activities are done at the different levels:
school/local community; sub-county, division, district, MoES, and by other
concerned actors such as MoFED and the President’s office.
The involvement of the local community that originally occurred through
the Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) now takes place through the School
Management Committee (SMC). SMCs include 7 appointed members and only
two members elected by parents (Suzuki, 2002). SMCs are not unique to Uganda.
They were established in Mali as well. In Uganda, SMCs and PTAs co-exist with
varying powers; the former is responsible for UPE grants. These committees
oversee school administration, development and improvement projects. The SMC
is intended to be the increasingly empowered governance mechanism dealing with
education locally.
The unique structures through which centralization has been strengthened
and decentralization implemented appear beneficial. Devolution, the higher
extreme of decentralization, is said to have a low risk of long-term failure. The
layered structures defined above may nevertheless present great risks for the
Ugandan education system.
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Decentralization has been practiced for almost a decade in Uganda,
longer than many countries in Africa. In the next section, we draw on the literature
on decentralization to theoretically tease out strong aspects and weak points of the
Ugandan education decentralization process. Even though no experimentation
phases were built into the process, analyzing the benefits and risks of the
implementation structures is likely to allow Sub-Sahara African countries to learn
from the experience of others at decentralization. Where professional will is led
by political will there are likely to be large gaps between proclaimed policies and
implementation practices. Uganda can learn from countries such as Spain and
Nicaragua where educational reform policy, not national law, guided the process.
For Caribbean and Latin American countries where national law guided the
decentralization reform such an analysis will help policy makers to assess the
benefits and risks of decentralization work as an educational reform.
Benefits
The education sector in Uganda has changed dramatically over a period
of ten years. The most notable change is in access to primary education.
In 1992, 2.4 million children enrolled with a gross enrolment ratio (GER)
of 68 per cent and a net enrolment ratio (NER) of less than 40 per cent.
Today more than 7 million children are enrolled, the GER is over120 per
cent, and the NER over 80 per cent. There have also been significant
changes in the number of and proportion of trained teachers, the
classrooms built and available and the textbook purchase and distribution
system. The implementation of the UPE program has meant an increase
in resource flows from higher government in terms of grants, materials
and construction funds. (Murphy, 2005, p. 139)
Grade 1 Gross intake rate and Primary level gross enrolment ratio (see
table 1) are the most commonly used statistics when illustrating the benefits of
decentralization. Many funding agencies are more comfortable dealing directly
with specific Ministries and with local communities. The central and local
administrative infrastructures as well as primary school and private secondary
school infrastructures are stronger today than they were before decentralization
(Deininger, 2003). Some least-developed districts such as Kalangala are
benefiting from the equalization grant. Community involvement in decisionmaking is encouraged through school level policy-making by the school
management committee and local councils (Suzuki, 2002). A detailed analysis of
the Ugandan reforms shows that in fact some sub-county government officials are
well aware of the preferences of parents.

104 Canadian and International Education Vol. 36 no.1 -June 2007

Table 1. Uganda Education Data
Low
income
1985

1990

1995

2000

2004

2005

241

241

241

24.3

27.8

28.8

260

250

SSAa

SSA

Surface area (000's
b

Sq.Km)
Population total
(Millions)
Per capita GNI (US$)

190

c

Adult literacy rate (%)

320

230

56.1

d

Primary level GER (%)

607

66.8

507
61.7

73.2

68.7

74.3

127

125

118

93.1

104.4

Secondary level GER (%)

10

12.5

12

15.9

18.6

16

29.8

45.2

Tertiary level GER (%)

0.8

1.2

1.7

2.5

3.4

5.6

9.1

88.7

107.8

-

172.7

163.5

109.8

122.3

58.2

57.1

61.1

77.8

10.6

10.4

40

36.2

2

1.9

52.7

50.1

Grade 1 Gross intake rate
(%)

-

Primary completion rate
(%)
School life expectancy
(years)

9.7

Progression to secondary
(%)
Repetition rate (%)

5.1

Primary pupil-teacher
ratio

34.5

28.5

35.2

50.3

42

Sources: World Development Indicators database, April 2006
http://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats/SummaryEducationProfiles/CountryData/G
etShowData.asp?sCtry=UGA,Uganda
Notes. a SSA stands for Sub Saharan Africa. b Blanks represent unavailable statistics. c
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above). d GER stand for Gross
Enrollment Ratio.

They fulfill them when institutional rigidities do not prevent them from doing so
(Steiner, 2006). In many schools, especially the missionary-founded schools and
boarding schools, there was previously a lack of community involvement. With
most administrative roles retained by the ministry and the district, and plus with a
majority members of the SMC appointed by the central and local governments the
perceived benefits of decentralization might not come to pass (Suzuki, 2002); for
example, SMC’s minimized participation of and accountability to parents. As
well, increased community participation may not necessarily result in increased
choice and diversity.
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Diversion of funds, irregular payments and decayed arrears plagued the
education system into the late 1990s. Because of corruption among officials and
slackened management measures there were chronic inefficiencies in transferring
teachers’ salaries from the central government to district governments and then to
the schools. Even getting new teachers appointed, posted and then enlisted on the
payroll took years. Teachers would teach for years before they got their first
salary. Salaries were terribly low. Salary arrears accumulated and some were
written off after decades. Some teachers quit the teaching profession to try
alternative means of survival;, others taught at private schools in addition to the
public schools where they were posted. In rural areas many teachers took on
casual labor jobs, opened up kiosks, or farmed to supplement their incomes. PTAs
attempted to fill the gap by remunerating teachers and funding schools. This
escalated the inequalities among schools, as parents of some schools were middleclass. Also this lowered the teacher’s professional status as parents became
employers of teachers. Government attempted to abolish PTA fees and to curtail
PTA responsibilities at the school but these efforts were unpopular among both
parents and schools (Al-Samarrai, 2003)
With the devolution of responsibility for elementary education to the
district level, teachers’ salaries are now paid more promptly and the management
of the payroll has improved. District administrators can manage their funds
without being slowed down by the bureaucracies of the central government.
Elementary school teachers are appointed, posted and remunerated over a period
of no more than six months. (This is not yet the case for secondary school
teachers, who suffer a recruitment freeze and are still appointed centrally.)
Remitting teachers’ salaries through banks circumnavigates the diversion of
salaries and other risks involved in cash payments. Prompt remuneration
undoubtedly reduces teacher burnout, increases teacher retention rates and boosts
teachers’ motivation and status in the community (Saito, 2000).
Gershberg (2003) notes that information on the conditional grants to
districts is published in the national press and provided to schools. This acts as a
measure for increased accountability and transparency. District headquarters are
required to display publicly the amount of UPE funds received and how they are
planning to allocate them. Schools and sub-counties, in turn, must publicize their
budgets and sources of funds. Monitoring and evaluation measures are put in
place at all levels. The technical assistance units support the move from control to
efficiency that came with decentralization. Further, there appears to be structural
collaboration among major national institutions such as the Planning, Local
Government and Education Ministries, along with the President’s office.
Administrative Risks
Geographic decentralization in Uganda has involved both existing districts and
new districts created by the process. Many existing districts had some form of
infrastructure, revenue and power. Thus the devolution process was somewhat
supported. However, some existing problems of administrative weakness and
inequity were imported into the new system. Even when the government has
invested a lot of funds in infrastructure, there is a chance that weak and new
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districts might be run on informal and personal principals such as whose child are
you, and that rules may be poorly followed and policy implemented less
rigorously. This has been the case for developing countries in Latin America. The
same is true in Uganda. Preparing new districts to take on their responsibilities
goes beyond preparing the physical infrastructure. Readiness checks need to be
put in place to ensure sufficient trained personnel along with financial and
community participation at the local level.
It may appear more equitable to decentralize all regions at the same time
and at the same pace. However, this method assumes that decentralization does
not require a foundation. No time is allowed for experimentation and adjustment.
Weaker and new districts do not get the opportunity to learn from stronger
districts. Hanson (1998) warns that all at once decentralization may send a
country into some form of chaos for the implementers. Even Spain, a developed
country, implemented its decentralization program in phases.
Privatization and support for private schools introduce new choices and
diversification. Some schools, especially those that claim to be international,
follow non-Ugandan policy and have their students learn non-Ugandan syllabi
such as the Cambridge syllabi. With the establishment of over twenty new
departments, institutions, programs and technical units, tools to safeguard the
national educational policy appear to have been strengthened. As in Spain,
decentralization is not likely to fragment the education system in Uganda because
a lot of policy-making is still done at the national level. However, there is little
chance that diversity and choice in schooling will be achieved. The national
educational policy, school curriculum and syllabus frameworks, national
assessment, teacher training and associated resource materials are still the
ministry’s responsibility.
Teacher education, especially in-service teacher education for
administrators, teachers and participating community members, has been catered
for by the Teacher Development and Management System (TDMS) and in the
districts. Whether this professional development is taking into account the
changing personal and professional needs of a decentralized system such as group
dynamics, negotiation and public relations is a question that needs empirical
study. In a USAID (2000) report it was noted that the quality of teaching and
learning suffers from weak leadership and an irregular flow of resources.
Decentralization aggravates needs for intensive, continuing training
including financial training for administrative and educational personnel as well
local authorities and parents (UNESCO, 2004). Strengthening leadership and
management of a decentralized education system requires work not only at the
district level but at the sub-county and even the parish levels. Strategies are
complicated, entailing not only training in technical skills such as budgeting and
data monitoring, but also higher-level skills such as political leadership and crossinstitutional collaboration. The number of districts whose capacity is inadequate
for the tasks at hand multiplies the challenge.
With both decentralization and centralization occurring simultaneously
there is likely to be duplication of duties and resources. In a country where
monarchy governments existed before centralization, one would hope that
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decentralization would be synonymous with federalization. Instead, in Uganda
cultural monarchies and decentralization uniquely run parallel to each other. In
tribal regions such as Buganda, which have relatively cohesive kingdoms, there is
tripling of systems: centralization, decentralization and federalization in the form
of restored monarchies (Stasavage, (2005). Some duplication of resources has
created depressing lived experience for teachers and students. One example is the
introduction of district examinations for candidate classes. Learning and teaching
now have to fit into the schedule of the regular school examinations, the district
examinations and the final national examination. At the school level this is turning
teaching and learning into an examination-focused practice.
Gershberg (2003) argues that devolution produces centralization at the
regional level, in part because sub-regional responsibilities might not be well
articulated in the decentralization legislation. This is particularly negative where
regional officials are found to be less in touch than national officials with citizen
preferences. The emergence of centralized districts is a growing issue in Uganda.
Worse still that the districts at times are out of touch with what happens at lower
levels does work against the assumptions of decentralization. With core education
decisions around curriculum and school issues still centralized either at the
national or district level, local community participation is still very limited.
Decentralization expanded the overall size of the bureaucracies to include
LCs. This expansion does not necessarily imply an increase in efficiency. There is
evidence that bureaucratic delays and centralized inadequacies have been curtailed
by decentralization, but corruption seems to have multiplied. This is more limiting
as corruption and non-professional management are now occurring at a minimum
of three levels of governance: national, district and sub-county.
Some combined advantages of decentralization and centralization are
equitable allocation of resources and programmatic unity. These may be offset by
diseconomies of scale, as seen in many Latin American countries. For a country
with such a small national budget, subdividing it at sub-national levels inevitably
increases administrative costs.
Financial Risks
Funding criteria need to be looked into. Payrolls with ghost teachers and
accountability data with ghost students and resources are commonly reported in
the local Ugandan press. Local finance management has created monitoring
loopholes. Formula school funding is facing limitations of misreported needs. A
common mismanagement method is to inflate the number of pupils in order to
receive more funds. The reason why this malpractice continues unchecked is that
correct data is not available (Royal Netherlands Embassy, 2003). The Ministry of
Education collects data annually through the Educational Management
Information System (EMIS). Due to misreporting, it is difficult to gather and
aggregate educational statistics. In September 2003 the District Service
Commission Secretary of a new district, Kiboga, was remanded for putting “ghost
teachers” on the payroll (Royal Netherlands Embassy, 2003).
Corruption grows. Corruption has been witnessed in the process of
transferring ferring finances from the central government to local governments.
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It is not rare for funds budgeted for one use to be diverted to another. Some
resources have been diverted. In the Gulu district, for example, part of the
Ush 2.6 billion (approximately 1.4 million USD) meant for elementary
teachers’ salaries was diverted in the financial year 1998- 1999, and another
part was embezzled. Also funds for classroom construction were robbed
during transportation. Districts such as Gulu have problems of accounting for
their School Facilities Grant (SFG) fund (The New Vision, 23 August 2003).
Construction, resource and salary funds are misappropriated or their
release to beneficiaries is deliberately delayed. Decentralization creates new
avenues for corruption. Corruption is tiered when deeper and systemic reasons for
corruption in developing countries are not addressed. Education funds sometimes
end up in private accounts of local government officials where they earn interest
for the officials. At the school level, head teachers are usually responsible for
malpractice, delay or nonpayment of wages, misappropriation of grants and
outright theft (Royal Netherlands Embassy, 2003). Corruption of all types—
bribery, fraudulent reporting of data, shirking by employees, misuse of funds
(UNESCO, 2004)—is taking place. Corruption, when it takes place in the
education system, threatens the moral fabric of society.
Different key stakeholders at various levels carry out monitoring activity
for capitation grants. At the district level monitoring and evaluation measures are
put in place by the many ministries as well as by the President’s office. Ministry
of Education officials visit the district at least every two months to verify
compliance and to appraise the district progress in the SFG implementation. The
district monitors and evaluates the performance of schools and contractors.
Monitoring is done at the school level by the District Inspector of Schools. The
LCs and the SMCs do daily monitoring and evaluation of contractors and of the
schools as well. But this local monitoring is weakened by high adult illiteracy
rates (see Figure 1, page 105), lack of interest and lack of knowledge (Suzuki,
2002) The monitoring level is evidently retroactive and therefore needs to be
supported with other proactive measures
In relation to procurement, the School Facility Grant (SFG) is plagued
by corruption in the Classroom Construction Program (CCP). Although primary
schools have little capacity to plan and account for expenditures, the schools are
responsible for selecting and overseeing local contractors, with the assistance of
the district assistant engineer and other district personnel. Schools are responsible
for applying the funds, hiring a suitable contractor, supervising the work, paying
the contractor, and ensuring the maintenance of services delivered. In 2001 an
SFG evaluation was done. Different construction elements, such as doors and
roofs, were monitored for their quality. The outcome of the quality evaluation
showed that out of 35 classroom projects only 14 showed no shortcomings. On
September 3, 2003, it was stated in a Special Audit Report from the Auditor
General’s office that out of Ush [Uganda Shillings] 238m remitted to the Gulu
district for the Schools Facilitation Grant, only Ush 17.2m was put to use. Ush
40m was unaccounted for, another 178.5m was reimbursed to the Ministry of
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Finance, and Ush 3.1m was spent on bank charges (New vision, October 01,
2003)
There have been cases where education officials have been arrested for
bribery when dealing with corruption cases.
The principal of Moroto Core Elementary Teachers College has been
arrested for allegedly attempting to bribe officials from the Inspector
General of Government to suppress a case. … [together with the bursar
they] attempted to bribe the officials with Ush 1 million. The duo was
summoned by the IGG for several other allegations, concerning
mismanagement of college funds and failure to give allowances to their
tutors (Sunday Monitor, October 12, 2003, p. 4.).
Not all districts registered the activities for which the funds were utilized. (This is
reflected in the district profiles). Some districts did account for the capacitybuilding funds (PAF report, April 2003).
Parliament has considered alternatives for decentralizing the selection,
procurement and distribution of textbooks. In light of the rampant corruption and
mismanagement at both the school and district level, parliament decided to
maintain centralized textbook procurement (USAID, 2000). Corruption increases
education expenses. It is distorting decision making processes and undermining
social values. That it is happening in the education sector defeats the main purpose
of education (UNESCO, 2004). Uganda could learn from countries such as Brazil
which has set stricter definitions for corruption, improved administrative and
control procedures through training, regional offices and manuals (UNESCO,
2004).
In addition to boosting accountability, participation procedures need to
be strengthened (Suzuki, 2002). There is a need to check situations where
perceived benefits to the communities and to marginalized districts and
stakeholders have been captured by the already privileged. In a way devolution of
responsibility is also a form of pushing resource burdens to lower levels. A worstcase scenario might arise years down the road, when local districts will be
required to fund their public services. This would be a disaster for low revenuegenerating districts, which are in the majority in rural areas.
Even though international donor agencies encourage decentralization as a
way of reducing the national debt, it is not evident that decentralization solves the
problem of limited central financial resources. The generation of more resources
at the local level faces management and resource base inadequacies. The local tax
base is very small in many rural districts. In some old districts that have been split
the revenue sources have dwindled as new districts sap the resource base of older
districts.
Political Risks
Educational decentralization is complex and might be different from other forms
of decentralization: it requires the will and strength of numerous systems,
institutions and personnel. Educators might wish to work at a shared vision,
including perceived out-comes and feared shortcomings of this reform at all
levels, including the community level. Since the Ugandan decentralization
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initiative was part of a larger political move, there are likely pockets of passive
resistance among the actors. With the numerous units and departments in the
Ministry of Education, along with tiered local governance at lower levels, one
hopes that reform initiatives will not be diluted at every level in Uganda as they
were in Venezuela (Hanson, 1998). UNESCO (2004) underscored the need to
raise awareness of administrative officials about the philosophy of
decentralization. To encourage participation in reform initiatives the Ministry
should ensure that this is a win-win situation at both the local and national levels.
Transferring positive financial and non-financial opportunities to the districts and
subsequent levels is key. Hanson (1998) has identified wide collaboration as a
component of successful decentralization. The Uganda national government has
not dumped financial and administrative burdens onto the districts as Argentina
did (Hanson, 1998).
With decentralization, the government replaced Parent Teacher
Associations (PTAs) with broader councils, School Management Committees
(SMCs), which include members of the community. As was the case in Colombia,
it was a political decision, not an educational one, to remove power from the PTA
as an influential group that had started subsidizing teachers’ salaries and other
school expenses (UNESCO, 2004). As the PTA’s power is removed, whether or
not the local community will rise up to participate in the SMCs depends on the
appointment procedures, level of establishment of the school and whether it is a
boarding school or a private school. Although disempowering PTAs appears to be
a way of keeping a balance between parental and community participation, many
villages contain schools in which their children cannot afford to enroll. SMC
committees might therefore not have any representation from parents of students
at such schools.
Councilors are elected positions in all five tiers. The President reshuffles
the cabinet regularly. In countries where this is the case, it has been observed that
the planning and implementation of decentralization is disrupted by the constant
top-level personnel changes. In Uganda the Minister of Education and the state
ministers at different levels of education have all regularly been reshuffled. Toplevel policy makers in education are usually not educators by profession.
In the transition period from centralized to decentralized education
delivery, clarity over roles and responsibilities has been a problem. This has been
especially so between the CAO, DEO, and Local Councils at lower levels.
Consider that some district staff such as the district assistant engineer report
directly to the Ministry of Education and Sports whereas others report to the CAO.
There is also an uncertain relationship between staff of the Teacher Development
and Management System (TDMS) and the DEO. This lack of clarity at the TDMS
may not facilitate the tailoring of personnel training to the needs of the district.
The responsibility of the Coordinating Center Tutor (CCT) at the district has come
into question: some DEOs want the tutor to report to the district administrative
office rather than to the Elementary Teacher College (PTC). Overlapping
responsibilities and role conflicts characterize decentralization of education in
Cameroon and Colombia as well (UNESCO, 2004). More explicit defining and
some revising are needed to eliminate confusion about responsibilities for
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reporting, management and accountability.
There is a concern that over-proliferation of conditional grants is not
promoting good governance and has a negative impact on service delivery. The
conditional grant for construction (SFG) functions reasonably well, but it has an
unclear relationship with the Local Government Act. The UPE capitation grant
suffers from serious delays at the district level, and from non-compliance with
administrative guidelines (USAID, 2000). Guidelines for both grants are seen as
excessively rigid. A number of reforms have been directly affected by
decentralization.
Decentralization as an Educational Reform: A Way Forward
Given Uganda’s background of political and economic instability, and the
continued instabilities in some areas of the country, a balance between national
crisis and political stability is a factor in the success of decentralization. One
hopes that with any change of governance, the next political leaders will have the
will to evaluate the successes and failures of the decentralization reform initiative.
Decentralizing the education system in Uganda makes sense as a
politically motivated development. Quantitative benefits are evident.
Decentralization has led to increased enrollment and resource flow at the
elementary level. Educators need to determine how to maximize the benefits of
the process. More infrastructure and analyses need to be put in place to ensure that
the perceived benefits such as increased diversity and community participation are
realized. It is in this way that educationalists will turn this political and economic
agenda into a curricular reform.
Educational leaders and personnel at the various levels will continue to
be challenged by the implementation of decentralization. There is a need to work
through the conceptualization of decentralizing education, to identify and
eliminate impediments to its effectiveness. There is need to reflect on the inherent
risks of decentralizing much less privatizing important services such as education.
Although it might be the case that delivery of feeder roads as a basic service is
facilitated by decentralizing governance, education service delivery is much more
complex.
Improvement in the quality of education has been slow. This is evidenced
by minimal changes in curriculum taught. Declining quality in education has
already deterred affluent parents from keeping children in public schools.
Educators could focus on qualitative indicators such as relevance of education
curricula, increased productivity of school graduates, increased retention rates and
literacy rates (Deininger, 2003; McGee, 2000).
Resources have been assigned to basic education to the detriment of other
levels and other public services as is the case in Morocco (UNESCO, 2004). In
Uganda decentralization has been reduced to districtization and as such blocked
development at the lower levels (UNESCO, 2004). In the new organization
structure there appears to be a void between the schools and the district level that
could usefully be filled by an equivalence of an educational board, a group of
schools. Boards would have a better capacity to interact and negotiate with the
districts governments than individual schools.
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The conception that decentralization would eliminate what it saw as
unnecessary bureaucratic channels and reduce corruption by minimizing the
number of centralized office levels to be consulted was mistaken. It is still too
early to determine whether the goals of boosting the level of monitoring; the goal
of managing school according to local priorities; the goal of improving financial
accountability; and the goal of raising local revenue to fund services have been
achieved.
Many criteria for successful decentralization would reveal that Uganda
was not ready for decentralization. The central government was not yet stable
especially as regards to resolving military conflicts in the North and East. Many
local authorities were not yet able to assume administrative and financial
responsibilities (UNESCO, 2004). However, the stable macroeconomic
environment; priority for education, political will, robust budget processes, and
the interest of multilateral donor agencies in decentralization (Murphy, 2005;
UNESCO, 2004) were central in the implementation of decentralization.
Decentralizing education raises questions some of which are unique to
developing countries. With the population size of Uganda close to 30 million
people (See Table 1; FAO, 2005) decentralizing governance seems helpful.
However the size of the country in terms of area and GNP does not appear to
warrant regional and economic decentralization. To perceive decentralization as a
blanket panacea to problems of political and economic instability is mistaken.
Acronyms
CAO
CC
CCT
CAO
DECBP
DEO
DIS
EMIS
EPRC
ESIP
FAO
LC
MoES
MoFED
MoLG
NCDC
NRM
PAF
PTA
PTC
TDMS
SFG

Chief Administrative Officer
Coordinating Center
Coordinating Center Tutor
Chief Administrative Officer
District Education Capacity Building Programme
District Education Officer
District Inspector of Schools
Education Management Information System
Education Policy Review Commission
Education Strategic Investment Plan
Food and Agriculture Organization
Local Council
Ministry of Education and Sports, Uganda
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
Ministry of Local Government
National Curriculum Development Center
National Resistance Movement
Poverty Alleviation Fund
Parent Teacher Association
Primary Teacher College
Teacher Development and Management System
School Facilities Grant
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SMC
UNEB
UNESCO
UPE
USAID
USE

School Management Committee
Uganda National Examinations Board
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
Universal Primary Education
US Agency for International Development
Universal Secondary Education

Note:
The current government is considering formally remunerating councilors at LC I and LC II
levels.
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